The 4th Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
October 17-19, 2011, Salerno - Amalfi Coast, Italy


SAGT 2012 will be held in Barcellona (Spain), on October 22-24, 2012. The website is now available at


The purpose of SAGT is to bring together researchers from Computer Science, Economics, Physics, Biology and Mathematics to present and discuss original research at the intersection of Algorithms and Game Theory.
The fourth edition of SAGT is organized by the Università di Salerno and will take place in Salerno - Amalfi Coast on October 17-19 2011.
The Symposium proceedings have been published by Springer: you can access the online version at
Extended and revised versions of selected papers will be considered for a Special Issue of the Theory of Computing Systems journal.

Important Dates

Submission Deadline: May 9, 2011, 23:59 GMT.
Notification: June 28, 2011.
Camera Ready Version: July 24, 2011.
Conference: October 17-19, 2011.

Invited Speaker

  • Bruno Codenotti: Computational Game Theory
    Abstract: We first provide a quick background in Game and Economic Theory, and then discuss some fundamental computational questions arising in these areas. We will focus on the interplay between Game Theory and Computer Science, with an emphasis on some of the most challenging open questions.
  • Xiaotie Deng: Computation and Incentives of Competitive Equilibria in a Matching Market
    Abstract: Matching market and its many variants have been an intensively studied problem in Economics and Game Theory since the seminal work of Shapley and Shubik. In many applications centralized prices are used to determine the allocation of indivisible goods under the principles of individual optimization and market clearance, based on public knowledge of individual preferences.
    Alternatively, auction mechanisms have been used with a different set of principles for the determination of prices, based on individuals’ incentives to report their preferences.
    This talk considers a single seller's market with an objective of maximizing revenue of the seller, who employs a market equilibrium pricing for allocation. We prove the maximum revenue market equilibrium mechanism converges, under an optimal dynamic re-bidding sequence of the buyers', to a solution equivalent to the minimum revenue equilibrium under true preferences of buyers, which in turn is revenue equivalent to a VCG solution.
    We will also discuss other related issues as well as open problems.
    (Based on joint work with Ning Chen.)